In nonmonotonic reasoning, a default conditional α → β has most often been informally interpreted as a defeasible version of a classical conditional, usually the material conditional. There is however an alternative interpretation, in which a default is regarded essentially as a rule, leading from premises to conclusion. In this paper, we present a family of logics, based on this alternative interpretation. A general semantic framework under this rule-based interpretation is developed, and associated proof theories for a family of weak conditional logics is specified. Nonmonotonic inference is easily defined in these logics. Interestingly, the logics presented here are weaker than the commonly-accepted base conditional approach for defeasible reasoning. However, this approach resolves problems that have been associated with previous approaches.
Introduction
A major approach in nonmonotonic reasoning is to represent a default as an object that one can reason about, either as a conditional in some object language, or as a nonmonotonic consequence operator. Thus for example "an adult is (typically or normally) employed" might be represented a → e, where → represents a default or normality conditional, distinct from the material conditional ⊃. In such approaches, one can typically derive other defaults from a given set of defaults. There has been J. P. Delgrande (B) School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6 e-mail: jim@cs.sfu.ca widespread agreement concerning just what principles should constitute a minimalNonmonotonic inference is then defined in the standard way for such approaches: given a default theory T and a classical (i.e. non-default) formula α, β is a default inference from α with respect to T, just if α → β is true in each of the nonmonotonic "extensions" of T.
This distinction between treating a default as a conditional or as a rule has been noted previously; see for example [22] . As well, work on inheritance networks [24] can be viewed as investigating proof theories for the latter interpretation. Work on causality such as [34] also falls in the rule-based framework. However a logic (that is, with both semantics and proof theory) capturing this interpretation has not been investigated previously, nor has a fully general nonmonotonic closure operator been developed under this interpretation. Last, it is suggested in the conclusion that this alternative interpretation may be widely applicable. In particular, it is suggested that this approach may be an appropriate vehicle for representing counterfactual reasoning [33] , which previously has been treated via the stronger interpretation.
The next section reviews previous work in conditional approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Section 3 informally reviews the approach while Section 4 describes a family of weak conditional logics. Section 5 considers the incorporation of a nonmonotonic extension to a conditional knowledge base. We conclude with Section 6. Proofs of theorems are contained in an Appendix.
Conditional logics and nonmonotonic reasoning

Conditional logics for representing defaults
In recent years, much attention has been paid to conditional approaches to default reasoning. Such approaches address defeasible conditionals whose meaning is based on notions of preference among worlds or interpretations. Thus, the default that a bird normally flies can be represented propositionally as b → f . 2 These approaches are typically expressed using a modal logic in which the connective → is a binary modal operator. The intended meaning of α → β is approximately "in the least worlds (or most preferred worlds) in which α is true, β is also true." Possible worlds (or, again, interpretations) are arranged in at least a partial preorder, reflecting a notion of normality or preferredness on the worlds. Given a set of defaults , default entailment with respect to , | ∼ , can be defined as follows [13] :
There has been a remarkable convergence or agreement on what inferences ought to be common to all such systems, and in the literature a seeming diversity of conditional approaches essentially allows the same inferences. These include approaches based on intuitions from probability theory such as -entailment [39] (or 0-entailment or p-entailment [1] ), from qualitative possibilistic logic [14] , as well as modal-logic based approaches such as preferential entailment [27] , C4 [29] , CT4 [7] , and S [9] . Consequently it has been suggested that the resulting set of inferences may be taken as specifying a conservative core [40] that arguably should be common to all default inference systems. One expression of this logic of conditionals is as follows.
Following [29] we call this logic C4, since it is the conditional logic based on a S4-like accessibility relation. 3 The logic includes classical propositional logic (that is, includes modus ponens and substitution of provable equivalents as well as all truth functional tautologies as axioms) and the following rules and axioms: 4 RCEA/LLE: From α ≡ β infer C4 (α → γ ) ≡ (β → γ ).
RCM/RW:
From β ⊃ γ infer C4 (α → β) ⊃ (α → γ ) ID/Ref:
C4 α → α CC/And:
Note however, these principles are not uncontentious; for example, [42] can be viewed as arguing against CC. Likewise, [37] suggests against CA in some cases. The semantics of these approaches is usually phrased in terms of a modal framework, in which possible worlds are ranked by a notion of relative normality or unexceptionalness. The underlying modal logic is generally taken to be S4 [26] (also called KT4 [11] ), in which accessibility between worlds is given by a reflexive, transitive binary relation. A conditional α → β is true at a world w just when, for every world accessible from w, there is an accessible world in which α ∧ β is true and α ⊃ β is true at all worlds that are less or equally exceptional, or if there are no accessible α worlds. Thus, "a bird flies," b → f , is true if, in the least b -worlds (if such exist), b ⊃ f is true. Since a penguin is a bird (either ( p ⊃ b ) or p → b ) but a penguin doesn't fly ( p → ¬ f ), this means that the least exceptional penguin-worlds are more exceptional than the least bird-worlds.
The resulting logic is weak. For example, the following relations which hold for the material conditional do not hold for the weak conditional:
Strengthening:
From α → γ infer α ∧ β → γ . Transitivity:
From α → β and α → γ infer α → γ . Contraposition: From α → γ infer ¬γ → ¬α. Modus ponens: From α → β and α infer β.
Nor would one want these principles to always hold for defaults. Thus, for strengthening, we do not want to conclude, given that a bird flies, that a bird with a broken wing flies. For transitivity, while an adult is normally employed full-time, and a university student is normally an adult, it is not the case that university students are normally employed full-time. For contraposition, just because I normally eat lunch 3 Lamarre's axiomatisation is not exactly as given here. As well, he allows iterated modalities, which we do not consider, as they add little of interest to the logic. 4 Two systems of nomenclature have arisen, one associated with conditional logic and one with nonmonotonic consequence operators. We list both (when both exist) when first presenting an axiom or rule. For example the conditional logic rule for substitution of logical equivalents in the antecedent is called RCEA; its nonmonotonic consequence operator, Left Logical Equivalence is abbreviated LLE. Hence we first list the rule as RCEA/LLE. After first usage, we use the notation specific to conditional logic, drawing from [10, 38] . at Joe's place, this doesn't mean that if I don't eat at Joe's then I normally skip lunch [7] . And, last, for modus ponens we want to allow that a normality conditional can be violated.
On the other hand, one would want these properties to hold by default. Thus given that birds normally can fly, and we are presented with a green bird, we would like to conclude that it flies. Similarly, given that a robin is a bird, we would like to be able to conclude that a robin flies. Clearly, this is not something that can be done within the logic; that is, given that a bird is asserted to fly by default, one cannot thereby conclude via (1) that a green bird flies by default. 5 That is, simply put, the inference b → f b ∧ g → f does not obtain or, alternatively, {b → f, ¬(b ∧ g → f )} is satisfiable. The problem is that there is nothing that requires preferred worlds in which a bird flies to include among them green-bird worlds.
Nonmonotonic extensions to conditional logics
Given the above considerations, various means of strengthening the logic have been proposed in order to incorporate strengthening or transitivity in a principled fashion. We focus in this subsection on two well-known approaches for nonmonotonically extending, or taking the (conditional) closure of, a conditional knowledge base, called rational closure and conditional entailment.
For rational closure [32] , it can be noted that, as with the base logic C4 described in the previous subsection, there have been an number of approaches, founded on different intuitions that again converge to essentially the same system. These approaches include rational closure, as well as System Z and 1-entailment [41] , approaches based on modal logic [8, 12] and possibilistic entailment [4] , and conditional objects [15] . We describe rational closure as an exemplar of this set of approaches.
The essential idea is that, in a semantic sense, a world is assumed to be as unexceptional as consistently possible. Thus, given that a bird flies, all other things being equal a world where that bird flies will be ranked below one where it does not. Consequently, since there is no reason to suppose that greenness has any bearing on flight, one assumes that green-bird-flying worlds are ranked with the least birdflying worlds if consistently possible. Hence one would expect to find that at the least green-bird worlds that fly is true; similarly, at the least nongreen-bird worlds we would also expect to find that fly is true. Hence a green bird (normally) flies as does a non-green bird. Define 6 β ≺ α by
Thus, informally, there are α ∨ β worlds, and at the least α ∨ β worlds, ¬α is true; hence β is true at such worlds and any α world is not less than these worlds. >From this we can define an ordering on formulas of classical logic. The sign C4 stands for logical derivation in C4 [29] , as the representative of the systems discussed in the previous section.
7 5 It is worth noting however that ASC gives a restricted version of strengthening, while RCM gives a restricted version of transitivity. 6 cf. [33, p . 54] 7 We use C4 in place of preferential entailment by appeal to [6, Thm 4.18] , which provides the correspondence result.
Definition 2.1 ([30]
) Given a default theory T, the degree of a formula α is defined as follows:
is not less than i and T C4 β ≺ α only if degree(β) < i 3. degree(α) = ∞ iff α is assigned no degree in Parts 1 and 2 above.
From this the closure operation is defined:
The rational consequence relation, with respect to default theory T, is given by:
We obtain that for default theory
Consider the following example:
Hence, a bird flies and has wings, while a penguins is a bird that does not fly. We obtain inferences such as
Let us consider the first inference, working backwards to see how it is obtained:
For this last relation, the antecedent of the conditional is equivalent to b and the consequent to ¬b ∨ ¬g ∨ f ; hence this is equivalent to
On the other hand, one does not obtain the result p | ∼ w even though this inference would appear to be sanctioned by the defaults p → b and b → w. The reason for this is that degree( p) = degree( p ∧ ¬w) = 1, as can be verified from the definitions. Thus, in the rational closure, one does not obtain inheritance of properties (in this case w) across exceptional subclasses (in this case p). The failure to allow full inheritance of properties has been addressed, for example in [3, 31] via the lexicographic closure of a set of defaults; as well, see [5] . However these extensions are syntax-dependent, and come at the expense of higher complexity than the original formulation.
A second, well-known approach is conditional entailment [22] . Conditional entailment was formulated in part to reconcile approaches exemplified by conditional logics on the one hand, and earlier approaches such as circumscription [35] on the other. In conditional entailment, defaults are arranged in a partial order, determined in part by the specificity of a rule's antecedent. This priority order over the set of defaults L is defined such that every set of defaults in conflict with a default r contains a default r that is less than that default in the ordering. Given this ordering on rules, an ordering on worlds can then be defined: If (w) and (w ) are the defaults falsified by worlds w and w respectively, then w is preferred to w iff (w) = (w ), and for every rule in (w) \ (w ) there is a rule in (w ) \ (w) which has higher priority. As usual, β is a default consequence of α just if β is true in the most preferred α worlds. We obtain the same consequences given for Example 2.1 as for the rational closure; moreover we obtain that p | ∼ w. However full inheritance of properties is not supported. Consider the following example [22] :
(Thus, a bird flies; a penguin is a shorebird; a shorebird is a bird; but a penguin doesn't fly.) The inference p | ∼ T b , which would be expected to hold from the defaults p → s and s → b , does not obtain. The difficulty here is that based on the default b → f , one can draw the contrapositive inference that a non-flyer is a non bird; this, along with the default p → ¬ f allows the possibility of a penguin being a non-bird, thereby blocking the desired inference of bird from penguin.
Both rational closure and conditional entailment formalise important and interesting phenomena in nonmonotonic reasoning, and have found widespread application in the literature. However there are problems with both approaches when considered as a general approach to formalising reasoning with defaults or normality conditionals. Inheritance reasoning has already been mentioned; other examples are given below. Nonetheless, it may be argued that these problems don't represent a limitation of the approaches per se, but rather indicate that these approaches are inapplicable to certain interpretations of defaults. Rational closure, for example, employs a very strong minimization criterion that is not always appropriate. Consider the following elaboration of an example given in [23] :
(Normally one does not eat with the fingers ( f ), but one does when eating asparagus at a meal (a); normally one uses a napkin (n), but not when one is eating while standing (s).) The rational closure of these conditionals gives that, if one is not standing (¬s), one does not eat asparagus (¬a). Clearly this interaction between unrelated defaults is undesirable.
In addition, consider the following example [22] :
(That is, an adult is normally employed, a university student is normally an adult but is not employed, and a fan of Frank Sinatra is normally an adult.) In both conditional entailment and rational closure we obtain the default inference that a fan of Frank Sinatra is not a university student, f | ∼ ¬u. This is too strong to be a plausible inference, since there is nothing in the example that would relate Frank Sinatra fans to university students. As well, if the conditional u → ¬e is dropped from the theory, one now loses the default inference that a Frank Sinatra fan is not a university student. In this instance, it seems very strange that a nonmonotonic inference between Frank Sinatra fans and university students should be mediated by a person's being employed or not.
Reconsidering default conditionals
As suggested, at least some of the preceding examples do not necessarily reflect a problem with the approaches per se. Rather, our thesis is that there are (at least) two distinct interpretations that can be given to a default. First, there is the intuition that a default is essentially a weak version of the material conditional, and should behave as such a conditional, except that it is defeasible. This intuition is seen most clearly in the expression of defaults by circumscriptive abnormality theories [36] . In this case a default α → β is represented as the formula α ∧ ¬Ab i ⊃ β. The circumscription of Ab i asserts (very roughly) that Ab i is false if consistently possible. Obviously, if Ab i is asserted to be false, we obtain the material conditional.
Conditional entailment explicitly adopts the intuition that a default is a weak version of the material conditional. That is, the default α → β is basically the same as → (α ⊃ β) (i.e. the material counterpart normally holds) together with specificity information implicit in α [22, p. 232 ]. There are certainly instances (for example in diagnosing abnormalities in a circuit [43] ) where one wants, all other things being equal, a default to behave as a material conditional.
However, there are also situations where one does not want this behaviour. For example, consider the theory that asserts of a person that if they were to get a good review at work, they would be happy. On the other hand, if they were to break their leg, they would not be happy:
In rational closure and conditional entailment, as well as in the corresponding circumscriptive abnormality theory, one obtains the inference r | ∼ ¬bl: if someone gets a good review then they won't break their leg. This is clearly undesirable. Moreover, it is not clear how such a theory could be repaired to avoid this conclusion; breaking the conflict by, for example, adding r ∧ bl → ¬h doesn't solve the problem.
Thus, in these approaches, given defaults α → γ , β → ¬γ , one nonmonotonically infers the default α → ¬β. As the above example indicates, this is not always desirable. Other such patterns are readily identifiable; consider an example (of unknown source) with defaults α → γ and γ → β. In the above cited approaches (rational closure, conditional entailment, and via a circumscriptive abnormality theory), one obtains as a nonmonotonic inference that α ∧ ¬γ → β. Thus, for a specific example, given the defaults that a university student is normally an adult (u → a) and an adult is normally employed (a → e), the inferred default u ∧ ¬a → e would allow one to conclude that a university student that was not an adult is employed. Informally the reason for this is as follows: >From the defaults u → a and a → e, one nonmonotonically obtains the "transitive" result u → a. But given the default u → a, one can similarly nonmonotonically strengthen the antecedent, yielding u ∧ ¬a → e. Clearly this is incorrect, as the inferred default that a university student is employed is mediated by their being an adult.
These considerations indicate that conditional closures, as represented by rational closure and conditional entailment (and by implication applying also to extensions of these works and related work) at times produce undesired conclusions. However, the monotonic consequences of the "conservative core" can also lead to unintuitive conclusions; consider the following example (also of unknown source):
A crime has been committed, of which the two suspects are John and Mary. In deciding who to arrest, the detective decides that if the murder weapon is found in John's room, then John will be arrested; if found in Mary's room then Mary will be arrested. If the weapon if found with John's fingerprints, then John will be arrested, and if Mary's then Mary.
We can symbolize this by:
What if the gun is found in John's room but with Mary's fingerprints (or vice versa)? Assume that to settle this conflict, it is decided that fingerprints decide the culprit. So we add
With these defaults we can derive r J → ¬ f M, that is if the murder weapon is found in John's room then it does not have Mary's fingerprints on it. This clearly is contrary to one's intuitions.
Note that r J → ¬ f M is a monotonic consequence of the logic, in that it is derivable from the original theory in the logic C4. So here, we have an unintuitive result in the logic itself -which is to say, to the extent that this result is counter to one's expectations, the blame cannot be allocated to any nonmonotonic closure step, since there is no nonmonotonicity in this example. (As well, we have already noted [42] and [37] as having identified implausible results in the underlying logic.)
Further, consider the preceding examples in the light of this last example. Assume that we have some generic approach where the underlying intuition is to treat a default as the material conditional wherever possible. In Example 2.5, there is no reason to not treat the two defaults as their classical counterparts, say r ⊃ h and bl ⊃ ¬h. (This in essence is what the aforecited closure operations, and approaches extending them, do.) Given the premiss r, it is perfectly sensible to conclude h; using the contrapositive of the second formula, h ⊃ ¬bl one then obtains ¬bl. The problem arises, informally, in treating bl → ¬h as a classical material conditional, from which one obtains the contrapositive.
This also informally explains example (2.4). In (2.4) one can derive (monotonically) the default a → ¬u. Since one already has the default f → a, there is nothing to prevent the "transitive" nonmonotonic inference yielding f | ∼ ¬u. If one accepts that a default transitivity should hold unless explicitly blocked, then the difficulty with this example can again be attributed to the underlying logic.
Consequently, there are situations in which nonmonotonic operations based on the default "core" logic lead to unintuitive results. Moreover, these unintuitive results arguably arise from properties of the underlying logic. This is illustrated in (2.4) and (2.5) where, in one fashion or another, one does not want to apply the contrapositive of a default; rather a default is to be applied in a "forward" fashion only. Under this second interpretation a default is regarded more as an (object-level) rule, whose properties would be closer to those of a rule of inference. Hence, given a conditional α → β, if the antecedent α happens to be true, we conclude β by default. Given ¬β we specifically do not want to conclude ¬α.
Work along these lines is not new. This distinction between regarding a default as a weak variant of a material conditional and as a rule has been noted in [22] . Inheritance networks [24] can be viewed as proof theoretic accounts of this interpretation, as can subsequent work in argumentation systems [17, 45] . In fact, [16] combines argumentation with a specificity relation on rules, to obtain an approach with properties (in the stratified case) among those of the "conservative core" logic, here called C4. A further motivation for exploring the rule-based interpretation of conditionals is that there has been recent interest in conditional accounts of causality (for example [34] ), in which reasoning via a default contrapositive is explicitly rejected. Thus, from "closing the switch causes the light to go on" we do not want to conclude that the light being off causes the switch to open. Thus, from "a causes b " we don't necessarily want to conclude "¬b causes ¬a." Hence a basic approach to rule-based conditional reasoning may shed light on the foundations of such causalitybased approaches.
Defaults as rules
The general approach developed here is the same as those described in the previous section: we begin by specifying a conditional logic of defaults and subsequently provide a principled, nonmonotonic means to extend the logic to account for irrelevant properties. Our point of departure is that we informally treat defaults as having properties more like rules of inference, in that defaults are intended to be applied in a "forward" direction only.
Our interpretation, roughly, is that the antecedent of a default establishes a context in which the consequent (normally) holds, or holds all other things being equal. Consider the default that normally asparagus is eaten with the fingers, a → f . Our interpretation is that, of the set of worlds in which a is true, the subset of worlds with f also true is more normal (usual, preferable) than the subset with ¬ f . This suggests a notation along the lines of a : (¬ f < f ). But to say of the set of worlds in which a is true, that the subset with f true is more normal than the subset with ¬ f true, is no different than saying that the set of a ∧ f worlds is more normal than the set of a ∧ ¬ f worlds. This suggests a notation along the lines of a ∧ ¬ f < a ∧ f .
Hence one can consider that, for default α → β, the formula α establishes a context, and in this context it is the case that β is more normal (typical, etc.) than ¬β. We express this semantically by introducing a binary relation of relative normality < w between propositions, where a proposition corresponding to a formula is the set of those possible worlds in which the formula is true. Formal details are give in the next section, but basically in a model M and for a world w, the proposition expressed by a formula α is denoted by α M w , and consists of those worlds considered possible at w in which α is true. Given with this notation, we can express that formula α → β is true in a model M at world w by
that is, the proposition α M w ∩ β M w is more normal (typical, etc.) than α M w ∩ ¬β M w at world w. It seems reasonable that this binary relation of relative normality < w be asymmetric and transitive, and so we generally assume that these conditions hold.
We note that the form of (3) has appeared regularly in the literature, going back at least to [33] . 8 The difference is that usually the interpretation of (3) is along the lines of "the least worlds where α ∧ ¬β is true are less normal than the least α ∧ β worlds." Thus for example in [33, pp. 54-56] P i Q is used to express that "the proposition P is at least as possible, at the world i, as the proposition Q." However, as the exposition makes clear, what this notation really means is that the least P-worlds are at least as possible, at the world i, as the least Q-worlds. Hence more perspicuous notation would express this relation as something like min(P) i min(Q). In any case, our notation will refer to the proposition expressed by these formulas. Consequently, our relation < w cannot be regarded as an accessibility relation in the normal sense, since it is a relation on sets of worlds.
Filling in the (formal) details yields a weak logic of conditionals C, significantly weaker than the so-called "conservative core," in which weak conditionals of the form α → β can be interpreted. The operator → is a binary modal operator defined not in terms of accessibility among possible worlds, but rather directly in terms of pairs of propositions. For the sake of increased expressibility, it is convenient to also introduce a notion of necessity, expressed by α for "α is necessarily true" or semantically "α is true at all worlds considered possible." Our notion of necessity is given a physical interpretation (as opposed to a more usual epistemic interpretation). Hence, this notion of necessity may be thought of as expressing a domain-specific integrity constraint. Thus we might use (s ⊃ c) to express propositionally that a spoon s is necessarily a piece of cutlery c.
Since the base logic is very weak, we also consider various strengthenings of the logic for expressing statements of normality. However, all of these strengthenings are still weaker than the so-called "core" set of defaults represented here by C4. Nonetheless, we show that these logics have desirable properties; as well, the undesirable inference illustrated in Example 2.6 is not obtained.
Moreover, it proves to be the case that nonmonotonic reasoning is definable in a very simple and straightforward manner. Consider again our example that one normally eats asparagus with the fingers, a → f . One would also want to be able to incorporate irrelevant properties, when reasonable. Thus it would seem that barring information to the contrary, one should (nonmonotonically) accept that normally white asparagus is eaten with the fingers, a ∧ w → f . 9 Semantically this would mean that, given a ∧ ¬ f M w < w a ∧ f M w , one would like to extend a model to
How to do this, at least in broad outline, is straightforward: Basically, the (semantic) relation X < w Y asserts that in the "context" (set of possible worlds) X ∪ Y, partitioned by X,Y, we have that Y is more normal than X. Our nonmonotonic assumption is that this obtains in all "feasible" subcontexts (where, of course "feasible" needs to be defined). That is, for proposition Z , unless there is reason to conclude otherwise, we assert that Z ∩ X < w Z ∩ Y. The next section develops the formal details of the family of weak conditional logics for defaults, while the following section addresses nonmonotonic reasoning in this family of logics.
The approach
Formal preliminaries
We assume some familiarity with modal logics. L PC is the language of classical propositional logic defined, for simplicity, over a finite alphabet P = {a, b , c, . . . } of atomic sentences. Formulas of L PC are constructed from the logical symbols ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, and ≡ in the standard manner. The symbol is taken to be some propositional tautology, and ⊥ is defined as ¬ . Our language for expressing weak conditionals, L, is L PC extended with the binary operator → and the unary operator . The operator → is the weak conditional, in contrast to the material conditional ⊃; the operator expresses necessity. For convenience, arguments of both → and are members of L PC ; that is, we do not allow nested occurrences of → nor . 10 As is usual, we use ♦ to abbreviate ¬ ¬.
Formulas are denoted by the Greek letters α, β, α 1 , . . . and sets of formulas by upper case Greek letters , , 1 , . . . . To simplify notation, unary connectives will bind most tightly, and the weak conditional → will bind most weakly. Thus for example ¬α ∧ β → β ∨ γ is interpreted as ((¬α) ∧ β) → (β ∨ γ ). Parentheses of course will be used to override operator precedence and for clarity. The symbol , possibly subscripted with the name of a system, is used to indicate derivation of a formula from a set of formulas. A subscript indicates derivation with respect to a particular system; hence C α indicates that α is deducible from in the logic C. The unsubscripted symbol denotes inference in classical propositional logic.
The semantics, developed in the next section, is based on the notion of a possible world, where a possible world can be thought of a complete, consistent description of how the world could conceivably be. Every formula then will be either true or false at a world w in a model M. Propositions correspond to sets of possible worlds; the proposition expressed by a sentence α will consist of the set of possible worlds in which α is true. Propositions are denoted by the upper case letters X, Y, . . . . Since we assume a finite alphabet P, we are guaranteed a 1-1 correspondence between propositions expressible by formulas and sets of possible worlds. 11 That is, we equate 10 Nested occurrences of are disallowed for two reasons. First, the operator is not required, and the development of → can be carried out without it; rather it is included for increased expressibility of the language so, for example, we can say not just that penguins are normally birds, but rather that penguins are necessarily birds. Second, our interest lies in the default operator →, and a full consideration of iterated modalities would add nothing to this endeavour while requiring a reasonable amount of off-topic formal development. 11 See [28] for a discussion and analysis of problems that arise in the infinite case.
the proposition expressed by a sentence with a set of possible worlds; conversely, given a proposition (set of worlds) X, one can easily determine a representative formula, for example by representing a world by a conjunction of those literals true at the world and then taking the disjunction over the worlds in the set X.
The base logic
Unlike the approaches described in Section 2, we do not employ a Kripke structure on possible worlds for the interpretation of the conditional →. Rather, each world in a model is associated with a binary notion of relative normality, denoted <, between sets of possible worlds, or propositions. Sentences are interpreted with respect to a model, as follows. 1. W is a set (of states or possible worlds);
W × 2 W with properties described below; 4. P : P → 2 W .
P maps atomic sentences onto sets of worlds, being those worlds at which the sentence is true. For w ∈ W, N(w) gives the set of those worlds considered possible at w. We require that w ∈ N(w) for every w ∈ W.
The relation < associates with each world w ∈ W a binary notion of relative normality between propositions; we write X < w Y to assert that, according to world w, proposition Y is more normal than X. Given our intended usage of < w we require that arguments to < w be disjoint:
As well, since < w is a relation of relative normality between propositions, the propositions in question must be possible at a world. That is, we require that if X < w Y then X, Y ⊆ N(w). Since < w is to be interpreted as capturing a notion of normality between propositions, the following four properties are necessary, in that if any were omitted, then < w would be arguably too weak to capture this notion of normality. These properties are as follows:
The condition min ∅ 1 asserts that for any proposition X, where X = ∅, we have that ∅ < w X, that is, that ∅ is the minimum of <. The second condition, min ∅ 2 , states that no proposition is < w the incoherent proposition. Clearly if < w is to reflect a notion of relative normality, it should be asymmetric. Thus, if X < w Y holds then Y < w X should not hold. Finally, we would want that < w be transitive. The proviso that X, Y, and Z be pairwise disjoint is added to the condition since < w is defined only for disjoint sets. That α is true at world w in model M is written M, w |= α. We identify the proposition expressed by a sentence α with the set of possible worlds in which α is true, denoted α M . That is,
We extend this notion to that of a proposition expressed by α according to world w by
Truth of a formula at a world in a model is as for propositional logic, with additions for and →:
Thus α → β is true just if the proposition expressed by α ∧ β is more normal than that expressed by α ∧ ¬β. If α is true at every world in a model, then α is valid in that model. If α is true at every world in a class of models, then α is said to be valid in that class of models. If α is true at every world in every model, then α is valid, written |= α.
For a corresponding proof theory, consider the deductive system closed under classical propositional logic (that is, including modus ponens and substitution of provable equivalents as well as all truth functional tautologies as axioms) along with the following rules of inference and axioms:
Nec:
From α infer C α. K:
We call the smallest logic based on the above axiomatisation C. Nec, K, and T characterise . CEA (Conditional Equivalent Antecedents) gives substitution of necessary equivalents in the antecedent of a conditional. CECA (Conditional Equivalent Consequents, given Antecedents) asserts the same thing with respect to consequents, but is somewhat more general, in that the consequents need to be equivalent just in the "context" given by the antecedent. RR is restricted reflexivity; here as with other conditionals we disallow the incoherent proposition ⊥ to be the antecedent of a true conditional. As we will see in the next section, RR corresponds to the semantic condition Min ∅ 1 . NA (Nihil ex Absurdo) asserts that the incoherent proposition never normally implies anything. [4] expresses this axiom nicely, that "while ⊥ (classically) entails anything, it should preferentially entail nothing." This axioms corresponds to the semantic condition Min ∅ 2 . CEM is the principle of the excluded middle for a weak conditional; in the semantics this is reflected by asymmetry of <. Similarly Trans reflects transitivity of < in the semantics. We obtain the following basic results:
The first two results express substitution of logical equivalents in the antecedent and consequent of a conditional. These rules have been called RCEA and RCEC in the conditional logic literature. The next two results effectively express the range of equivalent forms a conditional may take on with respect to the consequent. The following two results, Parts 5 and 6, connect the modalities and →. The former is analogous to a weakening of the principle RCE in the conditional logic literature, while the latter is slightly weaker than MOD. The penultimate result asserts that no proposition normally implies the incoherent proposition. The final result shows that we could in fact define necessity in terms of the weak conditional. However we retain as a primitive modality because we also look at a weaker logic C − in which this equivalence does not hold.
Of those axioms in the so-called "core" logic (Section 2), RCM, RT, ASC, CC, and CA (and their nonmonotonic consequence operator counterparts: Right Weakening, Cut, Cautious Monotonity, And, and Or) are not valid in C. Nonetheless, despite its (monotonic) inferential weakness, the logic C allows a rich set of nonmonotonic inferences, as covered in the next section. However, first we explore properties of the (monotonic) logic.
Properties of the logic
Soundness of the logic is shown by a straightforward inductive argument. For the completeness proof, it is of interest to first consider the weakest logic compatible with the semantic framework given in Definition 4.1. 12 Completeness is given with respect to the weakest realistic semantic framework; the corresponding weakened axiomatic system is called C − . Then the roles of nontriviality, asymmetry and transitivity in the semantics are clearly reflected in the axioms that are added to C − , yielding the system C. Definition 4.3 A weak comparative conditional model is a comparative conditional model (Definition 4.1), M = W, N, <, P except that we drop the conditions of nontriviality (Min ∅ 1 , Min ∅ 2 ), asymmetry, and transitivity of <.
(Since < w is assumed to be neither asymmetric nor transitive at this point, the notation < w is somewhat misleading, since < w is not any type of order.) Consider the logic over L closed under classical propositional logic and Nec, K, T, along with the following axioms:
The smallest logic based on the above axiomatisation is called C − . It is easily shown that C − is sound with respect to weak comparative conditional models. Completeness is demonstrated by constructing a canonical model [11, 26] for the logic C − , that is, a model such that every non-theorem of C − is false at some world in the model. While the overall approach is as given in the aforecited references, the particular construction for this class of logics is novel. A canonical model will be a structure M = W, N, <, P where W is the set of maximal consistent sets of sentences. That is, for w ∈ W in M, we have that w ⊂ L and for every α ∈ L we have α ∈ w iff ¬α ∈ w; as well if α ∈ w and α C − β then β ∈ w. See the aforecited references for details on how these maximal consistent sets of sentences can be constructed. 13 In a canonical model, and analogously to
Similarly, define
That is, |α| is the set of maximum consistent sets of sentences containing α, and |α| w is the set of maximum consistent sets of sentences containing α according to world w. 
The canonical model is clearly a weak comparative conditional model. Moreover, in the canonical model, the sentences contained in a world are precisely those that are true at a world. That is, we have the following result:
Theorem 4.2 Let M be the canonical model for C
− . Then for every α ∈ L and w ∈ W we have:
That is, for every α ∈ L we have that α M = |α|. We obtain the completeness result:
Theorem 4.3 If α is valid in the class of weak comparative conditional models then C − α.
Given this result, we can next consider the addition of properties to the logic that will strengthen C − to our "official" base logic C. We obtain the following correspondence between these semantic conditions and their corresponding axioms: 
Extensions to the logic
In the logic C, most properties of the relation < w stem from its being a strict partial order (viz. asymmetric and transitive), along with the fact that ∅ is the minimum in < w . In this subsection we look at strengthening < w by considering properties that seem reasonable for a notion of normality. Consider the following:
For Continues Down, if X is less normal than Y, then a stronger proposition than X (viz. X \ Z ) is also less normal than Y. That is, removing worlds from a proposition serves to strengthen it, thereby making it "less normal." Continues Up is a dual: if X is less normal than Y, then a weaker proposition than Y (viz. Y ∪ Z ) is also more normal than X. That is, adding worlds to a proposition serves to make it "more normal." For Restricted Continues Down/Up, if X < Y, then "part" of X can be shifted to Y; hence X is strengthened and Y weakened by the same set of worlds. Continues Down/Up combines Continues Down and Continues Up, as well as generalises Restricted Continues Down/Up. Weak Disjoint Union allows for the combination of two independent instances of < w , provided that the result yields a relation in which the arguments are disjoint.
Interestingly, Continues Down, Continues Up, and their combination have appeared in the belief revision literature. Our relation < is what [2] call a (transitive) hierarchy; 14 while < with Continues Down/Up is a regular hierarchy. Their interpretation of < echoes ours for X < Y, that "X is less secure or reliable or plausible . . . than Y" [21, p. 75] .
Consider next the following formulas:
WSA (Weak Strengthening of the Antecedent) is a stronger version of the easy result in C:
). It appears to have not been discussed previously in the literature. CW (Conditional Weakening, or "Conditionalisation" in nonmonotonic consequence relations) gives a conditional version of one half of the deduction theorem. The formula CM allows weakening of the consequent of a conditional. In conditional approaches it more often appears in a weaker form, as a rule of inference, where it is called RCM or (as a nonmonotonic inference relation) Right Weakening. As well, this formula can be seen as allowing a form of modus ponens in the consequent of a conditional. Combining WSA and CW yields the formula WCA (Weak CA), which allows incorporation of information uniformly in the antecedent and consequent of a conditional. D supplies a certain "reasoning by cases" for the conditional.
We obtain the following correspondence between semantic conditions and the axiomatisation: We obtain the following relations:
For ease of discussion, let C + be the logic:
C + might seem plausible as an "official" logic for a rule-based interpretation of defaults and statements of normality. However, as we discuss in the next section, even this logic has questionable interactions with the most straightforward nonmonotonic extension to the logic.
We obtain the following easy results:
The first (called CM) is a converse to CC/And. The second, (RCM or Right Weakening) is a common condition for conditional approaches; it is a weaker version of our CM.
The following formulas are not derivable in C + :
The first of these is called CK in the conditional logic literature, MPC in that of nonmonotonic inference relations. It is the natural strengthening of CM to modus ponens in the consequence of a conditional. The second is called CA or OR. It is a natural strengthening of D. As mentioned, there are authors who see this formula as problematic. As well, various other characterizing formulas in preferential systems are not theorems here, specifically CC/And, RT/Cut, and ASC/Cautious Monotony. The lack of CC/And means that we do not have what [20] call an inference system. We next very briefly consider further extensions to the logic.
Further extensions to the logic
We could go on and add other conditions in the semantics. Space considerations dictate against a lengthy discussion, but two conditions are worth noting here:
Disjoint union has appeared frequently in the literature, for example [14, 18, 44] . The addition of disjoint union requires that the notion of a model be altered slightly (from a relation < to ≤); the resultant semantic framework appears to correspond to the basic definition of a plausibility structure [19] . We note however that the addition of disjoint union does not alter the set of valid sentences obtained with UD and D. The addition of connectivity would make < w a qualitative probability in the terminology of [44] .
Considerations on nonmonotonic reasoning
We claimed at the outset that the logic C and its strengthenings would allow a simple approach to nonmonotonic inference. In this section, we give a definition for nonmonotonic inference and discuss specific examples of its application. Since the primary goal of the paper is to explore (monotonic) conditional logics for weak conditionals, we defer a full exploration of nonmonotonic inference to future research.
For nonmonotonic inference, the central idea is that, given a partition {X, Y} of a context X ∪ Y ⊆ N(w), the relation X < w Y asserts that Y is more normal (unexceptional, etc.) than X. To obtain nonmonotonic inference, we simply assume that this relation holds in any subcontext, that is X ∩ Z < w Y ∩ Z , wherever "reasonable."
Informally this notion of "reasonable" is straightforward to specify:
That is, from X < w Y we assert X ∩ Z < w Y ∩ Z , unless there is a reason (given by Y < w X above) not to do so. As well we have the constraint that Y ∩ Z = ∅. More formally, we have the following: 
we have:
It can be noted that in Definition 5.1, if we have Continues Down, then we don't need to bother with X and X , since monotonically we get that if X < Y then X < Y for any X ⊆ X . As well, Definition 5.1 in combination with Continues Up may perhaps give too many relations: >From X < Y we have X < Y ∪ Z by Continues Up and then, all other things being equal, we nonmonotonically conclude X < (Y ∪ Z ) ∩ Z or X < Z . Thus from X < Y and arbitrary (but in accordance with the conditions of the definition) Z , we obtain that X < Z . Assuming that this is a problem, there are two ways in which this difficulty can be resolved. First, one can decide that Continues Up (and so CW) is too strong for our logic of conditionals. Or, second, the Definition 5.1 can be restricted to apply to certain "minimal" sets of worlds.
It seems that for "reasonable" theories, there is just a single augmented comparative conditional model. However, it is possible to construct theories in which this is not the case; consider for example the theory in which we have
There are three augmented comparative conditional models, in which X < Y and Y < Z holds, or Y < Z and Z < X holds, or Z < X and X < Y holds, respectively.
We define |= * as validity in the class of augmented comparative conditional models; that is |= * α iff α is true at every world in every augmented comparative conditional model. Nonmonotonic inference is defined as follows:
We say that β is a nonmonotonic inference from α with respect to , or just β is a nonmonotonic inference from α (written α | ∼ β) if the set is clear from the context of discussion.
We illustrate nonmonotonic inference first by a familiar example:
Thus a bird flies and has wings, and a penguin is (necessarily) a bird that does not fly. We obtain the following:
To see how this type of inference obtains, consider the first of these default inferences, b ∧ w | ∼ f . In every model of the set of sentences (4-7) we have
Thus a green (g) bird has wings, as does a non-green flying penguin. As well we obtain p | ∼ w, and so a penguin inherits the property of having wings by virtue of necessarily being a bird. This can be seen as follows: 
However, if we were to replace (6) by p → b , we would still obtain the weaker b ∧ p | ∼ w. This appears to be reasonable, given that a normality conditional α → β does not imply a strict specificity relation between α and β whereas (α ⊃ β) does.
The next example further illustrates reasoning in the presence of exceptions.
So a Quaker is a pacifist while a Republican is not, and a Quaker is generous. We obtain q ∧ ¬r | ∼ p and q ∧ r | ∼ g. Thus in the last case, while a Quaker that is a Republican is, informally, an exceptional Quaker, it is nonetheless still generous by default.
The next set of examples may not add many new examples of nonmonotonic inferences per se; however it does illustrate the application of nonmonotonic principles involving normality defaults where there is no suggestion of a probability-based interpretation of the default. Consider again Example 2.3:
We get:
We do not obtain the undesirable inference ¬s | ∼ ¬a found in Example 2.3. Further, for Example 2.4 we do not obtain f | ∼ ¬u. Last, we note that while we obtain full incorporation of irrelevant properties, we do not obtain full default transitivity. Thus
does not yield a | ∼ c (nor, incidentally, do we obtain ¬b | ∼ ¬a). 
Conclusion
We have argued that there are two interpretations of a default conditional: first as a weak (typically material) implication, and second as something akin to a rule of inference. The former interpretation is explicit in, for example, circumscriptive abnormality theories, and implicit in approaches such as conditional entailment and rational closure. It is clear that there are many, and varied, applications in which the first interpretation is appropriate. However we have also noted that there are various reasons to suppose that this is not the only such interpretation: First, other authors have argued against principles of the "core" logic underlying this first interpretation (specifically, against CC/And and CA/Or). Second, there are examples (such as Example 2.6) in the underlying (monotonic) logic that give results that are too strong. Third, there are various examples of inferences in approaches such as rational closure or in conditional entailment that are either too weak or too strong. Last, there are emerging areas (such as causal reasoning) in which a "weak material implication" interpretation is not appropriate. While this distinction has been recognized previously, what is new here is the development of a family of logics, with a novel semantic theory and proof theory along with a specification of nonmonotonic inference, for the "rule-based" interpretation. All of the logics presented here are quite weak, at least compared to the so-called "conservative core" or, equivalently, the system P of [27] . We argue however that such lack of inferential capability is characteristic of a "rule-based" interpretation of a conditional. Moreover it proves to be the case that nonmonotonic reasoning is defined very easily in these logics, and allows a rich set of inferences concerning the incorporation of irrelevant properties and of property inheritance.
An open question concerns how informal, commonsense defaults should be classified -whether as a defeasible classical (material) conditional or as a rule. As discussed, the great majority of past work has favoured the "defeasible classical conditional" interpretation. Such previous work includes non-default conditionals, such as Lewis' system-of-spheres semantics for counterfactual assertions [33] . However, a case can be made that such non-default examples, formerly interpreted as belonging to the first category, may be better interpreted as belonging to the "rule" category. Consider the following example of counterfactual assertions in which the following statements, concerning a past party, are given [33] :
"If John had gone it would have been a good party" and "If John and Mary had gone it would have not been a good party." From these assertions, we deduce in Lewis' "official" counterfactual logic VC that "if John had gone, Mary would not have gone." 15 This, to most readers, is a strange result: John's going and Mary's going are (presumably) independent events. Arguably this result ought not to obtain, and so perhaps counterfactuals, as previously modelled by Lewis' sphere semantics, may also be better interpreted via the "rule" interpretation. ¬α) ⊃ ¬(¬α → ¬α)). >From the equivalence C α ≡ (¬α ≡ ⊥) we obtain C α ⊃ (¬(⊥ → ¬α) ⊃ ¬(¬α → ¬α)). Given axiom NA, this is equivalent to C α ⊃ ¬(¬α → ¬α). The converse, C ¬(¬α → ¬α) ⊃ α is an instance of the contrapositive of RR.
In the following proofs, we make extensive use of the fact that in the canonical model, for a set of worlds X, there is a formula γ such that |γ | = X. This is a simple consequence of the fact that the set of atomic sentences P is finite, and so W also is finite. For example, for X ⊆ W where, X = ∅, one could choose γ = |X| i=1 γ i where, for w i ∈ X, γ i is a conjunction of the literals true in w i . For X = ∅ one could choose ⊥ or the negation of any propositional tautology. In particular, this means that for w ∈ W in the canonical model, there is a formula ψ such that |ψ| w = N(w).
Proof 4.2
The proof is by induction on the construction of a formula of L.
1. For the base case, consider a formula p i ∈ P. We have:
For a formula of the form α ∧ β:
M, w |= α ∧ β iff M, w |= α and M, w |= β iff α ∈ w and β ∈ w (by the induction hypothesis) iff α ∧ β ∈ w (by the definition of a maximal consistent sets of sentences). 3. For a formula of the form ¬α:
M, w |= ¬α iff M, w |= α iff α ∈ w (by the induction hypothesis) iff ¬α ∈ w (by the definition of a maximal consistent sets of sentences). 4. For a formula of the form α:
Then for every w ∈ N(w) we have that α ∈ w by the definition of N(w). By the induction hypothesis we obtain that M, w |= α. This means that for every w ∈ N(w) we have that M, w |= α, whence
Hence, since w is a maximal consistent set, we have that ¬ α ∈ w. By Lemma 2.3 of [25] we have that {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {¬α} is consistent; hence there is w ∈ W such that {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {¬α} ⊆ w . Therefore M, w |= α by the induction hypothesis, and so M, w |= α by the truth conditions of .
At this point we interpolate a lemma, whose proof follows that of the preceding step, and that will be used for the next part of the theorem. Proof A.1 To begin we show that if |ψ| = N(w) then ψ ∈ w, by proving the contrapositive. To this end, assume that ψ ∈ w. Since w is a maximal consistent set, we have that ¬ ψ ∈ w. By Lemma 2.3 of [25] we have that {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {¬ψ} is consistent. Thus there is w ∈ W such that {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {¬ψ} ⊆ w . Hence w ∈ N(w) by the definition of N(w) in the canonical model. However ψ ∈ w , and therefore w ∈ |ψ|. Consequently |ψ| = N(w).
Assume that |ψ| = N(w). >From the preceding we have that ψ ∈ w.
Since ψ ⊃ δ, by Nec we have that C − (ψ ⊃ δ) and so (ψ ⊃ δ) ∈ w. Since w is closed under deductive consequence, we have that δ ∈ w.
Last, consider α → β:
(a) Suppose that α → β ∈ w. We claim that |α ∧ ¬β| w < w |α ∧ β| w .
From Definition 4.4 we will have |α ∧ ¬β| w < w |α ∧ β| w just if we can show, for every γ, δ ∈ L PC that if |γ ∧ ¬δ| w = |α ∧ ¬β| w and |γ ∧ δ| w = |α ∧ β| w then γ → δ ∈ w. Consequently assume that for γ, δ ∈ L PC we have
Let ψ be a formula such that |ψ| = N(w).
. 16 Analogously, we have that ψ ⊃ ((α ∧ ¬β) ⊃ (γ ∧ ¬δ)) and so ψ ⊃ ((α ∧ ¬β) ⊃ ¬δ). From the preceding we obtain that ψ ⊃ (α ⊃ (β ≡ δ)). Lemma A.1 then implies that (α ⊃ (β ≡ δ)) ∈ w. By assumption we have α → β ∈ w. Since also (α ⊃ (β ≡ δ)) ∈ w, and since w is closed under logical consequence in C − , an application of CECA gives α → δ ∈ w. Next, we have that |γ | w =|γ ∧ ¬δ| w ∪ |γ ∧ δ| w =|α ∧ ¬β| w ∪ |α ∧ β| w =|α| w . Consequently, since |γ | w = |α| w and ψ is a formula such that |ψ| = N(w), we have ψ ⊃ (α ≡ γ ). Applying Lemma A.1, this implies that (α ≡ γ ) ∈ w. Since we have also shown that α → δ ∈ w, an application of CEA yields γ → δ ∈ w. This then is sufficient to prove our initial claim, that |α ∧ ¬β| w < w |α ∧ β| w . By the induction hypothesis we have that If follows from Definition 4.4 that |α ∧ ¬β| w < w |α ∧ β| w . By the induction hypothesis, in a manner analogous to the preceding, α ∧ ¬β M w < w α ∧ β M w , and thus M, w |= α → β.
Since it will be useful, we extract the following result from the preceding proof: Proof A.2 Let w ∈ X. Thus α ∈ w , and w ∈ N(w).
It follows that {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {α} is consistent. (Otherwise we would have {β | β ∈ w} ¬α. From compactness we would have that for some finite set {β 1 , . . . , β n } ⊆ {β | β ∈ w} that β 1 ∧ · · · ∧ β n ⊃ ¬α, whence β 1 ∧ · · · ∧ β n ⊃ ¬α, whence ¬α ∈ w, from which |¬α| = N(w), contradicting ∅ = |α| = X ⊆ N(w).)
Since {β | β ∈ w} ∪ {α} is consistent, this means that ¬α ∈ w; we then obtain that ¬ ¬α ∈ w by the construction of w, which is the same as α ∈ w.
Proof 4.4
We have to prove that in the canonical model for logics closed under a given axiom or rule that the corresponding condition holds. 17 1. We show that in the canonical model for C − + RR that min ∅ 1 holds Let w ∈ W and consider some X = ∅, X ⊆ N(w), and select some α such that |α| w = X. (Recall that this last part is justified by the fact that we deal with a finite language.) Since X = ∅, we have that α is consistent, and so via Lemma A.2 we have α ∈ w. Hence, since the canonical model for C − + RR is closed under RR, we have that α → α ∈ w. But this means (Corollary A.1) that |α ∧ ¬α| w < w |α ∧ α| w , or ∅ < w |α| w , as required. 2. We show that in the canonical model for C − + NA that min ∅ 2 holds. Assume that X < w ∅, for some X ⊆ N(w) and w ∈ W. Consequently from Definition 4.4 we have that for every α, β where X = |α ∧ ¬β| w and ∅ = |α ∧ β| w , that α → β ∈ w. Specifically, select a formula α such that X = |α| w and take β = ⊥; we have X = |α ∧ | w = |α| w and ∅ = |α ∧ ⊥| w = |⊥| w ; that is, we have α → ⊥ ∈ w. Now, |α ∧ γ ∧ β| w = |α ∧ β| w = Y, where the first equality follows since |β| w ⊆ |γ | w . As well, |α ∧ γ ∧ ¬β| w = |α ∧ ¬β| w ∩ |γ | w = X ∩ (N(w) \ Z ) = X \ Z . But this means that X \ Z < w Y. Consequently, for arbitrary X, Y, Z , we get that if X < w Y then X \ Z < w Y. 2. We show that in the canonical model for C + CW that Continues Up holds.
Assume that we have X < w Y for some w ∈ W in the canonical model for C + CW, and consider some Z ⊆ N(w) such that X ∩ Z = ∅. We have from Definition 4.4 that: for every α, β where X = |α ∧ ¬β| w and Y = |α ∧ β| w , α → β ∈ w. Let ψ, γ be formulas such that |ψ| w = Z ∪ |α| w and |γ | w = (N(w) \ Z ) ∪ |α| w . >From set theory we get |α| w = |ψ| w ∩ |γ | w and so |α| w = |ψ ∧ γ | w . Lemma A.3 then yields (α ≡ (ψ ∧ γ )) ∈ w.
We have ψ ∧ γ → β ∈ w since (α ≡ (ψ ∧ γ )) ∈ w and α → β ∈ w, and using CEA. Since w is closed under CW and modus ponens, we obtain that ψ → (γ ⊃ β) ∈ w. From Corollary A.1 we get that |ψ ∧ γ ∧ ¬β| w < w |ψ ∧ (¬γ ∨ β)| w . Now, Let γ be a formula such that |γ | w = |β| w ∪ Z .
We have that |β| w ⊆ |γ | w ; consequently via Lemma A.3 we obtain that (β ⊃ γ ) ∈ w.
Since we have α → β ∈ w and w is closed under CM and modus ponens, we obtain that α → γ ∈ w.
As a result, we get that |α ∧ ¬γ | w < w |α ∧ γ | w from Corollary A.1.
We have the following, where each step follows from set theory: Since by assumption X 1 < w Y 1 we have that |α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ | w < w |α ∧ β ∧ γ | w . We obtain via Corollary A.1 that (α ∧ β) → γ ∈ w. A similar argument for X 2 and Y 2 gives that (α ∧ ¬β) → γ ∈ w.
Since w is closed under D and modus ponens, we obtain that α → γ ∈ w.
Thus from Corollary A.1 we obtain that |α ∧ ¬γ | w < w |α ∧ γ | w or
Since this holds for all choices of α, β, γ , our result obtains.
